

# BUNKER LEVY SCHEMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SHORT SEA SHIPPING

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## RESEARCH BASED ON...

2 papers:

- 1) Presented at SCC2015 entitled “Bunker levy schemes for GHG emission reduction in international shipping”
- 2) New work

## NECESSITY FOR FURTHER EMISSION MITIGATION ACTIONS

- Inadequacy of existing measures
  - Emission Control Areas (ECAs)
  - Energy Environmental Design Index (EEDI)
  - Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP)
  
- Market Based Measures: the new solution?
  - (Maritime) Emission Trading Scheme
  - Bunker Levy Scheme

SSS: high competitive environment

ECAs= operational cost increase


Bunker levy schemes = modal shift ?

### *AIM OF THE RESEARCH PAPER*

- Effect of this regulatory regime on the competitiveness of SSS against road transportation (modal shift).
  - a unit tax per ton of fuel
  - an ad valorem tax; as percentage of fuel prices

## METHODOLOGY

- Equilibrium in shipping; interaction among the four markets
- Application of the cobweb theorem to the shipping industry
- Binary Choice Model



Source: Ezekiel (1938)

## ASSUMPTIONS

New order for ships at period t according to Luo et al.(2009)

$$N_t = n \times \Pi_t$$

n= average proportion of profit accounting for new vessel purchase

$\Pi$ = Profit ,

$$\Pi_t = P_t W_t - F_t \Psi_t$$

P=freight rates (\$/TEU), W= TEUs carried, F=fuel costs

$$F_t = \rho_t f_t \lambda_t S_t^3$$

$$\Psi_t = \frac{W_t \cdot d_t}{H_t \cdot S_t \cdot \rho_t}$$

$\rho$ =operating time at sea (hours), f=fuel price (\$/ton),  $\lambda$ =coefficient of ship's energy efficiency, S= (knots) is average speed.  $\Psi$ = no of ships required, d= route distance (nautical miles) and H is ship's average capacity (TEU)

## Based on the cobweb theorem

For the unit tax scheme

$$\Delta Z_t = n(P_{t-\theta}W_{t-\theta} - (OC_{t-\theta} + \rho_{t-\theta}(f_{t-\theta} + TP)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3)\Psi_{t-\theta})$$

$$\Delta P_t = \delta(\Delta W_t - \phi\Delta Z_t) = \delta\Delta W_t - \delta\phi n(P_{t-\theta}W_{t-\theta} - (OC_{t-\theta} + \rho_{t-\theta}(f_{t-\theta} + TP)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3)\Psi_{t-\theta})$$

For the *ad valorem* scheme

$$\Delta Z_t = n(P_{t-\theta}W_{t-\theta} - (OC_{t-\theta} + \rho_{t-\theta}f_{t-\theta}(1+VP)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3)\Psi_{t-\theta})$$

$$\Delta P_t = \delta(\Delta W_t - \phi\Delta Z_t) = \delta\Delta W_t - \delta\phi n(P_{t-\theta}W_{t-\theta} - (OC_{t-\theta} + \rho_{t-\theta}f_{t-\theta}(1+VP)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3)\Psi_{t-\theta})$$

$\Delta W$ =change in cargo transported,  $\Delta Z$ =change in fleet capacity,  
 $\delta > 0$ =freight adjustment factor on the basis of demand and supply alterations,  $\phi > 0$  (constant)=average fleet capacity utilization rate.

## A DYNAMIC ECONOMIC DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL

$$P_j = \exp(V_j) / \sum_{j=r,s} \exp(V_j) = 1 / (1 + \exp(V_r - V_s))$$

$$U_r = V_r = \theta_{r1}x_{r1} + \theta_{r2}x_{r2} + \theta_{r3}x_{r3}$$

$$U_s = V_s = \theta_{s1}x_{s1} + \theta_{s2}x_{s2} + \theta_{s3}x_{s3}$$

$x_{j1}$	demand
$x_{j2}$	speed
$x_{j3}$	freight rates

**For the unit tax scenario**

$$U_s = \theta_{s1}x_{s1} + \theta_{s2}x_{r2} + \theta_{s3}(\delta(\Delta X_t - \varphi\Delta Z_t) = \theta_{s1}X_t + \theta_{s2}S_t + \theta_{s3} * (\delta\Delta X_t - \delta\varphi n(P_{t-\theta}X_{t-\theta} - \rho_{t-\theta}(f_{t-\theta} + T)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3 \Psi_{t-\theta}) + P_{t-1}))$$

**For the ad valorem scenario**

$$U_s = \theta_{s1}x_{s1} + \theta_{s2}x_{r2} + \theta_{s3}(\delta(\Delta X_t - \varphi\Delta Z_t) = \theta_{s1}X_t + \theta_{s2}S_t + \theta_{s3} * (\delta\Delta X_t - \delta\varphi n(P_{t-\theta}X_{t-\theta} - \rho_{t-\theta}(f_{t-\theta} + (1+T)\lambda S_{t-\theta}^3 \Psi_{t-\theta}) + P_{t-1}))$$

Bunker levy schemes = decrease of SSS' s utility


### Scenario for analysis

$X_{s,t-1}$	1950000 TEU
d	750 nm
S	12 knots
H	2000 TEU
Fuel price (\$/t)	300 or 600
$\theta_{s1}$	0.000003
$\theta_{s2}$	0.0055
$P_{t-1}$	800 \$/TEU
$\lambda$	0.0012
$\theta_{s3}$	-0.003
$\delta$	0.00894
n	0.0000034
$\varphi$	42.27
$\theta_{r1}$	0.000001
$\theta_{r2}$	0.0045
$\theta_{r3}$	-0.002
$X_r$	1500000 TEU
$S_r$	43 miles/hour
$X_{r3}$	1330 \$
$X_{st}$	2200000 TEU
$P_{t-\theta}$	900 \$/TEU
$X_{t-\theta}$	1850000 TEU

## AD VALOREM SCHEME

Tax percentage (%)	Modal shift percentage (%)	
	Low fuel prices (300\$/t)	High fuel prices (600\$/t)
2	0.3	0.6
5	0.7	1.4
10	1.4	2.9
15	2.2	4.3
20	2.9	5.7
30	4.3	8.6
40	5.7	11.4


Modal shift for the *ad valorem* scheme



## UNIT TAX SCHEME

Tax amount (\$/t)	Modal shift	
	Low fuel prices (300\$/t)	High fuel prices (600\$/t)
5	0.2	0.2
10	0.5	0.5
20	0.95	0.95
40	1.9	1.9
50	2.4	2.4
80	3.8	3.8
100	4.8	4.8
120	5.7	5.7
150	7.2	7.2
200	9.6	9.6
250	11.9	11.9

**Modal shift for the unit tax scheme**



## CONCLUSION

First attempt to model modal shift from SSS to road in case of bunker levy scheme enforcement

Ad valorem  SSS' s Utility decrease  
Unit tax scheme  Modal shift

Policy implications: Unit tax prevents uncertainty

Future steps of this research: Sensitivity analysis of variables,  
Effect on Social Welfare after modal shift occurrence.

Thank you

Questions?